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Friday, May 7, 2010

The UK election disaster

The election results are bad news for the UK, its bonds (gilts), and its currency. The Lib Dems emerge as the kingmaker, and their demand is proportional representation, which would be a constitutional disaster for the UK. 

Although the two party system has its drawbacks, such as the perpetual need for intraparty consensus and thus maddening vagueness. But if you look at countries that have proportional representation, you will see no party with a majority and the need to form awkward coalitions with greens, fascists, vegans and religious extremists. 

The UK is looking at the biggest fiscal challenge since 1945. Because (like New York) the UK lives off of the securities industry, government revenue is collapsing and the fiscal deficit is an out-of-control 13% of GDP. 

This no time to change the UK constitution in a way that will lead to legislative chaos. This could lead to a loss of confidence in gilts and sterling. 

(But maybe good news for the US; as investors flee Europe, the US will enjoy strong capital inflows and declining Treasury yields.)

Krugman lays out the Greek endgame


May 7, 2010
OP-ED COLUMNIST

A Money Too Far

So, is Greece the next Lehman? No. It isn’t either big enough or interconnected enough to cause global financial markets to freeze up the way they did in 2008. Whatever caused that brief 1,000-point swoon in the Dow, it wasn’t justified by actual events in Europe.

Nor should you take seriously analysts claiming that we’re seeing the start of a run on all government debt. U.S. borrowing costs actually plunged on Thursday to their lowest level in months. And while worriers warned that Britain could be the next Greece, British rates also fell slightly.

That’s the good news. The bad news is that Greece’s problems are deeper than Europe’s leaders are willing to acknowledge, even now — and they’re shared, to a lesser degree, by other European countries. Many observers now expect the Greek tragedy to end in default; I’m increasingly convinced that they’re too optimistic, that default will be accompanied or followed by departure from the euro.

In some ways, this is a chronicle of a crisis foretold. I remember quipping, back when the Maastricht Treaty setting Europe on the path to the euro was signed, that they chose the wrong Dutch city for the ceremony. It should have taken place in Arnhem, the site of World War II’s infamous “bridge too far,” where an overly ambitious Allied battle plan ended in disaster.

The problem, as obvious in prospect as it is now, is that Europe lacks some of the key attributes of a successful currency area. Above all, it lacks a central government.

Consider the often-made comparison between Greece and the state of California. Both are in deep fiscal trouble, both have a history of fiscal irresponsibility. And the political deadlock in California is, if anything, worse — after all, despite the demonstrations, Greece’s Parliament has, in fact, approved harsh austerity measures.

But California’s fiscal woes just don’t matter as much, even to its own residents, as those of Greece. Why? Because much of the money spent in California comes from Washington, not Sacramento. State funding may be slashed, but Medicare reimbursements, Social Security checks, and payments to defense contractors will keep on coming.

What this means, among other things, is that California’s budget woes won’t keep the state from sharing in a broader U.S. economic recovery. Greece’s budget cuts, on the other hand, will have a strong depressing effect on an already depressed economy.

So is a debt restructuring — a polite term for partial default — the answer? It wouldn’t help nearly as much as many people imagine, because interest payments only account for part of Greece’s budget deficit. Even if it completely stopped servicing its debt, the Greek government wouldn’t free up enough money to avoid savage budget cuts.

The only thing that could seriously reduce Greek pain would be an economic recovery, which would both generate higher revenues, reducing the need for spending cuts, and create jobs. If Greece had its own currency, it could try to engineer such a recovery by devaluing that currency, increasing its export competitiveness. But Greece is on the euro.

So how does this end? Logically, I see three ways Greece could stay on the euro.

First, Greek workers could redeem themselves through suffering, accepting large wage cuts that make Greece competitive enough to add jobs again. Second, the European Central Bank could engage in much more expansionary policy, among other things buying lots of government debt, and accepting — indeed welcoming — the resulting inflation; this would make adjustment in Greece and other troubled euro-zone nations much easier. Or third, Berlin could become to Athens what Washington is to Sacramento — that is, fiscally stronger European governments could offer their weaker neighbors enough aid to make the crisis bearable.

The trouble, of course, is that none of these alternatives seem politically plausible.

What remains seems unthinkable: Greece leaving the euro. But when you’ve ruled out everything else, that’s what’s left.

If it happens, it will play something like Argentina in 2001, which had a supposedly permanent, unbreakable peg to the dollar. Ending that peg was considered unthinkable for the same reasons leaving the euro seems impossible: even suggesting the possibility would risk crippling bank runs. But the bank runs happened anyway, and the Argentine government imposed emergency restrictions on withdrawals. This left the door open for devaluation, and Argentina eventually walked through that door.

If something like that happens in Greece, it will send shock waves through Europe, possibly triggering crises in other countries. But unless European leaders are able and willing to act far more boldly than anything we’ve seen so far, that’s where this is heading.

Thursday, May 6, 2010

Europe: Time for Plan B

Europe is heading into the abyss. 

The EUR 110B Greek rescue package is a bridge loan that keeps Greece out of the capital market for only 18 months, and then assumes that all will be well. 

At the end of 2011, when the bailout runs out, Greece will have higher debt and a a smaller GDP. A country with an unsustainable debt load will be unable to issue debt at reasonable spreads. 

This is obvious to all observers, which is why the bailout lacks credibility. And as investors lose confidence, they will fly to quality and abandon the rest of the PIGS (or PIIGS, because Ireland looks awful). 

What are the options for the peripheral members? I see three:
  • Rescheduling (default).
  • Rescue by the ECB.
  • Redenomination, devaluation and inflation.


Rescheduling means loss of market access and a massive fiscal consolidation: a nonstarter. An ECB rescue has been vetoed by the  Teutonic bloc and "has not been discussed". Germany doesn't want its currency backed by Mediterranean junk bonds.

I had been under the impression that a unilateral redenomination of government bonds would be treated legally as default. However, Vincent Truglia (former head of Moody's sovereign risk unit) thinks otherwise. He says that (1) redenomination was not default when the euro was adopted; and (2) the election of law on Greek governments is Greek, which is to say debtor-friendly (no default). 

So Vincent argues that the peripherals should immediately redenominate, devalue and inflate. I agree. The open question is whether to continue to service external debt or to do an Argentina and give foreigners a haircut. Vincent says that devaluation will accomplish this without a legal default.

The price of quitting the euro is the risk of being kicked out of the EU, but there is no legal mechanism to expel a member. But you have to ask: is Greece European or Near Eastern? It was part of the Ottoman Empire for centuries. It sure is no Finland. As my Spanish colleague used to say, "It is not a serious country".

The problem here is that there is little public consideration being given to redenomination and resurrection of the drachma. Instead, Europe and Papandreou are wedded to the austerity/rescue plan, which will lead to an even bigger train wreck. 

Oh, and by the way, the Bundestag has not yet voted for the rescue and it's not in the bag. That would lead directly to Plan B. 

Wednesday, April 28, 2010

Greek Air Force motto: "We Do Our Part"

The Greek Air Force (no jokes please) is now on strike. 

A former (Spanish) colleague of mine at Moody's used to divide countries into two categories: serious and unserious. When someone wanted to upgrade an Argentina, he would say "They are not a serious country." 

Well, I don't think that there is any military in the world that has ever gone on strike (although it is true that certain unserious European militaries are unionized, but "peace is their profession").

So Greece now suggests that there should be three country categories instead of two: serious, unserious, and Hellenic. 

The Dow can't ignore Europe

I don't think that the American stock market (Mr. Dow) has incorporated the full import of the European financial crisis. 



Worst case, we are looking at a wave of sovereign defaults, a collapse of a series of government bond markets, instantaneous fiscal consolidation, deflation, and sharp decline in nominal and real GDP (over there, and I don't just mean Club Med, I mean the EU). 

Given globalization, as Japan remains becalmed, China slows, and Europe tanks, it's awfully hard to be bullish on anything but US Treasuries. I really don't see how gold benefits from deflation--that is a correction waiting to happen. (We could easily see gold go below $1000.)



 I see a big global selloff that will get the Dow Dow below 10,000. I felt the same way in September of 2007, but back then I believed that big rate cuts would fully offset the subprime crisis (because I didn't understand that we were facing a national secular deleveraging). This time, there is no Fed for Europe (well, there is, but it's brain dead). 

So what is the bull case for global growth? I'd bet double dip 75, growth 25.

Europe is to big to fail...but

It is now obvious that Southern Europe is too big to fail. But it is not clear exactly who is supposed to fund the bailout. 

First of all, Germany can't guarantee all of the sovereign bank debt in the EU, and Brussels itself has no financial resources whatsoever. The EU is a club, not a country.

So who is the lender of last resort for Spain and Italy? 

Well, it's not the IMF. The IMF has limited resources. It can come up with packages in the $50 billion range for large countries, but this is too small for a country like Spain. The IMF has been a big help in the Baltics, but now we're talking about real countries.

As I have said before, the ECB has a EUR 2 trillion balance sheet. It is big enough, but politically, the Germans are not going to turn the ECB into a development bank without a fight. And they have a veto.

Which leads us back to the IMF. It is in everyone's interest that Europe does not have a wave of sovereign (and bank) defaults, plunging the world into an unthinkable crisis. Therefore, Greece has morphed from a eurozone crisis to a global crisis which includes the US, Japan, and China. 

I think it is necessary for the IMF to be dramatically recapitalized, and for it to access the debt markets like the World Bank. It needs a trillion dollar balance sheet. Simultaneously, Europe needs a regional IMF with serious resources as well. But time is of the essence.

Europe's Plan A is to bridge Greece into 2011 and to pray to the eurogods that Spain, Portugal and Ireland retain market access (doubtful). If that doesn't work, time is very tight, while an IMF recap and the creation of an EMF simply can't happen quickly. 

Before this is over, the IMF will be bigger and Europe will probably have an EMF. But not soon enough to forestall a series of crackups that could make Lehman look like a fender-bender.

Investment conclusion: good for Treasuries, the dollar, the yen. Bad for global equities, the euro, and any other investment that begins with the letters eur. Probably bad for sterling as well (they're in Europe).

Return of the drachma?

Readers will note that I think Greece will default. In a previous post I wondered whether they would also repudiate their external debt.

But there is a second option, which would be to exit the euro and unilaterally redenominate its debt (and all domestic debt) into drachma. This doesn't avoid default, but it does get Greece back to the status quo ante bellum, with monetary sovereignty and the freedom to inflate away its problems. 

Of course there is also a third option: default, repudiate, and redenominate. Argentina did this in 2001 and it worked.

Carl Levin and the Wall Street witchhunt

Let me get this straight. Jimmy Cayne and Dick Fuld are bad people because they lost billions and drove their firms over the cliff. I get this. If you are a Wall Street CEO you are supposed to hedge your bets, take prudent risks, make money and remain solvent.

But now I learn that Lloyd Blankfein is a bad person because he...hedged his bets, took prudent risks, made money and remained solvent. He repaid his TARP money with interest, and the government made a nice profit on the warrants they took on Goldman stock. 

His other crime is "profiting from the financial collapse". If this is a crime, then I guess Cayne, Fuld, Pandit, O'Neal and the rest are heroes because they lost billions during the collapse. I don't want to be rude, but does Carl Levin have even a clue?

Can the ECB bail out Southern Europe?

Unlike the Fed, the ECB does not have a growth or stability mandate. The hawkish Germans insisted that its charter focus exclusively on price stability. To my knowledge there are no doves on the ECB's board. 


But despite this, would it be prudent for the ECB to stand idly by while the dominoes fall in Southern Europe? If the contagion spreads to Portugal, Spain, Italy and Ireland, eurozone nominal GDP will fall,  prices will fall, and the euro will collapse. 


Bernanke, speaking of the Great Depression, famously said "We [the Fed] did it. It was our fault." Does Trichet want a European collapse to be his historical legacy?



Today's FT:
“We have gone past the point of no return,” said Jacques Cailloux, chief Europe economist at the Royal Bank of Scotland.“There is a complete loss of confidence. The bond markets are in disintegration and it is getting worse every day. The ECB has been side-lined in the Greek crisis so far but do you allow a bond crash in your region if you are the lender-of-last resort? They may have to act as contagion spreads to larger countries such as Italy. We started to see the first glimpse of that today.”

Mr Cailloux said the ECB should resort to its “nuclear option” of intervening directly in the markets to purchase government bonds.
This is prohibited in normal times under the EU Treaties but the bank can buy a wide range of assets under its “structural operations” mandate in times of systemic crisis, theoretically in unlimited quantities.

Mr Cailloux added: “This feels like the banking crisis in late 2008 post-Lehman, though it has not yet spread to other asset classes. The ECB will have to act it if does.”

I would add that the consolidated assets of the ECB and its member central banks is EUR 2 trillion, which should leave considerable room for offsetting asset sales in order to sterilize the monetary impact.



The debt market gives up on Greece

The debt markets are closing for Greece as it sinks in that its debt trajectory is unsustainable, whether or not it receives the EU/IMF rescue package. The FT reports today: 

Greek two-year bond yields jumped more than 3 percentage points to more than 18 per cent Wednesday morning amid growing nervousness about the state of the country’s deteriorating public finances. 

Greek two-year bond yields are now the highest in the world, more than even the weakest emerging market economies such as Argentina and Venezuela. 

The extra premium Greece must now pay over Germany, Europe’s benchmark economy, for two-year debt is more than 17 per cent, an unsustainable level. 

Gary Jenkins, head of fixed-income research at Evolution, said: “Greece cannot afford to pay yields this high as the interest rate charges would be so great, the country’s public debt would continue to rise until the economy collapsed.” 

Greek 10-year yields also rose more than a percentage point to 11.034 per cent.